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It is a pleasure to be here again at Sophia University Institute, among many friends and colleagues. During the 1950s, while what was to become the European Union was being launched, 
the majority of its founding fathers—Schuman, De Gasperi, 
Monnet, and others—were practicing Catholics. For them, Ca-
tholicism was not just an identity but formed the basis of their 
entire moral and religious framework. Yet, it was an era in which 
no one felt the need to mention a Christian identity. It was simply 
not a subject of debate, a nonissue, and the founding documents 
reflect this situation. 
The debate around Europe’s Christian identity was to begin 
only in the late 1990s, a time when this initial situation no longer 
applied. At this time, the number of practicing Christians in pub-
lic life had greatly diminished. Christianity, which had in the ear-
lier period been a nonissue, could no longer be taken for granted. 
The question of so- called Christian identity had begun to emerge 
in an increasingly secularized Europe.
We should recognize that, in a sense, the expression “European 
culture” is a vague one. I will not attempt to change that here. 
Nevertheless, as implied above, in the early decades of what was to 
become the European Union, there was little or no gap between 
shared societal values and Christian values. In fact, most existing 
secular values at that time were simply secularized Christian val-
ues. Whether we look at the concept of the family, ideas regarding 
the “good” and “bad,” or values relating to sexuality, we do not find 
much difference between Christian and secular moral frameworks 
in this earlier period.
Perhaps an example will make my meaning clear. We could 
take the case of the debate over the contraceptive pill in the 1960s. 
Europe




Abstract: The author offers a reflection on the question of Christian 
identity in a changing Europe. He points out that it was only as the 
number of practicing Christians in public life diminished that the ques-
tion of the Christian identity of the continent arose. He questions the 
kinds of uncritical identification of European and Christian culture 
that arises in the fact of increased Islamic immigration. He surveys the 
principal options facing Christians and Christian culture as Europe 
faces an uncertain future.
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sexual freedom. Furthermore, the notion of sexual freedom had 
not been considered under the control of the church, so to speak, 
before that time. 
However it happened that, to respond to the problems posed by 
such rapid societal changes, the Catholic Church tried to offer its 
own immediate solution by releasing the encyclical Humanae Vitae. 
This encyclical was a surprise for everyone at the time because 
Vatican II had already been viewed as the church’s theological re-
sponse to increasing secularization. Faced with this encyclical, the 
general public, including Christians, saw it almost as a step back-
ward, to a time before Vatican II. In reality, it was not a backward 
move at all. Instead, the encyclical recognized what could be de-
scribed as two different societies, two different sets of values. And 
it is a concept that has been affirmed in different ways by every 
pope since. Thus, we recognize that from the time of Humanae 
Vitae onward, European values should no longer be regarded sim-
ply as secularized Christian values. 
This fact is responsible for many of the challenges before us. 
After this division created what I would call the “moral diversity” 
in Europe, can we continue to speak of Europe’s Christian iden-
tity? What does Christian identity now mean? 
The term “identity” brings us into contact with the complex-
ity of our situation. Christian identity is not simply identical to 
Christian religion, Christian culture, or Christian values. The prob-
lematic term “Christian identity” has quite a history. Everyone in 
Europe claims an identity and does so in a constantly evolving sit-
uation. To give just one example (this is not an in- depth analysis), 
we are faced with many regional and political claims, from Scot-
land to Catalunya, to having an “identity.” What does the concept 
In France, Jeannette Vermeersch, the wife of the general secretary 
of the French Communist Party, opposed contraception, saying 
“contraception was a capitalist plot to destroy the worker families.” 
From our vantage point, this meant she was advocating what we 
today call family values. At that time, these were seen as values of 
the working class. Going back even further, we can note that when 
the French parliament voted in 1921 to permit abortions, this was 
not seen as a church issue at all; rather it came from a kind of a 
nationalist reaction to the conclusion of World War 1. Many con-
sidered it to be more a demographic issue than a political one, or 
question of values. 
In brief, we can say that until the 1960s, little or no gap existed 
between secular and Christian sectors of society. In fact, if any-
thing, there was often an association between hard- core believers 
and atheists during this time. France’s fight over the concept of 
laicité (secularity) was not a fight of values but rather a fight about 
political power and control of society. There was, of course, a fight 
between the secular state and the church, but, compared with the 
current European experience, a very significant difference. Before 
the 1960s, in general, secularists were still religiously literate, with 
a baseline knowledge of religion, many having attended Catho-
lic schools. At some level, in other words, they “knew” religious 
teachings.
So, we might ask: What changed in the 1960s that caused the 
development of a divide not present in prior decades? The change, 
I believe, was in the predominantly secular culture itself. Over a 
span of some years we witnessed extraordinary, historical changes 
in value systems, almost all concentrated around issues relating to 
family and sexuality, the definition of a family, and what constitutes 
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see it as a way of protecting Poland’s Christian identity. One arch-
bishop was prompted to remind priests that they are not under any 
obligation to attend these demonstrations. This is because what is 
called the Christian identity of Poland, and we can say of Europe, 
is not based on Christian values. 
I am not suggesting that governments should implement Chris-
tian values. Current populist movements throughout Europe are, 
in fact, expressions of contemporary secular society, even if some 
have their roots in traditional extreme right- wing ideologies, such 
as fascism. All these populist movements—perhaps with the ex-
ception of the Italian League party (formerly Lega Nord)—are 
“modern” in terms of values. Thus, the Dutch far- right leader 
Geert Wilders objects to Islam because of its positions on women’s 
and homosexual rights. Even in France, the nation now is promot-
ing laicité rather than Christian identity. While Marine Le Pen’s 
father wished to defend France’s Christian identity, his daughter is 
more concerned with defending France’s secular identity. 
Thus, secular and Christian members of society tend to drift in 
separate directions. An ever- increasing divide between faith com-
munities and the secular majority is becoming markedly evident. 
In France, Catholic faith communities, rather than the institu-
tional church, are beginning to resist the secular agenda: There 
now exists a militant Catholic movement called La Manif pour 
Tous that took to the streets. It is the first time in a century that 
Catholics are going to the streets as Catholics. Thus, we are seeing 
a kind of radicalization of faith communities. This is true not just 
in the Catholic world but also among some Protestant Evangeli-
cals and Orthodox Jews, who oppose shifts in Europe’s values. 
The Catholic Church itself is increasingly acknowledging the 
fact that at this moment in history, Christian communities are 
of identity truly mean? Is it a language? Not always. Is it a way of 
life? A normative set of values? I would say that the term is almost 
void of any real meaning. And this is precisely the problem. 
So, when opposition to immigration or to Islam comes to the 
fore, and we hear talk of Europe’s identity, or, more specifically, 
about a Christian, European identity, we must ask ourselves what 
this means precisely. In Germany or Holland, for instance, gov-
ernment questionnaires for refugees and visa applicants ask if the 
applicant accepts European values. What are these values? One 
question in Germany, for example, regards the acceptance of nu-
dity, because according to the questions posed, this is considered 
commonplace in Germany. So, if you say “No, No, No” in answer 
to this question, you are out. Similarly, most country question-
naires ask questions regarding homophobia. Forty years ago, it 
would have made no sense to ask such a question: Homosexuality 
was a crime in most of Europe until the 1960s. Now the situation 
is quite different: Homosexuality is legally protected and consid-
ered a part of the European value system. 
Again, how in today’s world do we continue to speak about 
European values, or the roots of our European identity, in a situ-
ation where societal values and norms have so rapidly shifted in 
forty short years? We can no longer refer to an imaginary Euro-
pean identity still rooted in the Roman Empire, or in the Middle 
Ages, or in the Renaissance or the period of the Enlightenment, or 
in Christianity. Europe is clearly dominated by a secular culture, 
which is no longer a secularized, Christian culture. 
Since Humanae Vitae, then, the clash between the church and 
society has increasingly been about values. It is not so obviously 
about theology. Currently, we are seeing Polish people block their 
borders, to prevent the entrance of refugees into the country. They 
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A second option, which Jürgen Habermas discussed with Car-
dinal Ratzinger years ago, is what I would call the “translation” of 
religious values into acceptable secular values. Instead of speaking 
about abortion, speak about life. French Cardinal Philippe Bar-
barin, for example, chose a similar path in the same- sex marriage 
debate. He never said that it is against religious laws, values, or 
teachings but rather that it is a decision that would have a negative 
sociological and anthropological impact on society. This tactical 
option found some support among a small number of psycholo-
gists and others and some Christian families. But for the most 
part, it too failed to be particularly effective. 
The third option is also the title of a recent (bestselling) book 
by American author Rod Dreher, The Benedict Option. All is con-
sidered lost and we are now in the hands of the barbarians. Faced 
with a loss of Christian values, we can withdraw into faith com-
munities, like the Benedictines did, not necessarily by building 
actual monasteries but by creating more “social monasteries.” We 
must ask: Why not try this third option? If we let each sector of 
society fight to maintain its own specific identity, we remain a 
fragmented Europe. We would have faith communities and other 
groups based on their own different, regional identities. Europe 
would be transformed into a set of small pieces, all different from 
one another. 
It is of primary importance for secular states to acknowledge 
and make allowances for religion while maintaining the distinc-
tion between civil society and religion. It is not a matter of le-
gality but rather of how religion is perceived. Persons of religious 
faith must be open to dialogue, acknowledge that they may be in 
the minority, and understand that dialogue is not facilitated by 
a minority. And this is still something new. Until recently, the 
prevailing idea was that European culture is Christian and that 
Europeans have forgotten this and should return to their religious 
roots. But in the face of ever increasing secularization, it is clear 
that this kind of discourse is ineffective. People are not returning 
to their religious roots. Indeed, in some countries, such as France, 
religion is now seen by many as the problem. If you take a poll of 
the population and ask people in France what does laicité mean, 
most will tell you that religion should be kept in the private sphere. 
Freedom of religion, however, is the freedom to practice the reli-
gion. It is not just the freedom of belief. You have the right to 
practice, and, by definition, you practice in the public sphere. So, 
there is a discrepancy between the law and how people interpret 
the law, which is now more and more ideological. 
So, with the divide between faith communities and the pre-
dominant culture growing, what kinds of actions are needed? 
What is needed at this point in Europe’s history? Until now, most 
faith communities have chosen one of three options. The first is 
what I would call the re- conquest option. This includes actions such 
as the legal fight to ban abortion, trying to impose teaching of 
religion in schools, and so on. We see examples of this option 
in Poland today and in many predominantly Muslim countries. 
There are, in fact, marked similarities between what’s happening 
today in countries such as Poland and Turkey. This option of at-
tempting a “re- conquest” of lost values serves only to isolate faith 
communities more and more instead of building bridges. Over the 
past thirty years we have seen that leaders who fight against new, 
secular legislation around issues, such as abortion, gay marriage, 
and civil unions, almost always lose. 
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continuous fighting against current societal norms and values. In 
Europe, we are not short on convictions; we have convictions of 
every sort. We have Christians who have converted to Islam, Mus-
lims who have converted to Christianity, and persons of religious 
faith who have embraced a deeply secular outlook. What is needed 
is to reopen and rediscover this historically important relationship 
between the secular and the religious and the relationships among 
those of different religions.
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